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Abstract—Small unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) are
expected to take major roles in future smart cities, for example,
by delivering goods and merchandise, potentially serving as
mobile hot spots for broadband wireless access, and maintaining
surveillance and security. Although they can be used for the
betterment of the society, they can also be used by malicious
entities to conduct physical and cyber attacks to infrastructure,
private/public property, and people. Even for legitimate use-cases
of small UASs, air traffic management (ATM) for UASs becomes
of critical importance for maintaining safe and collusion-free
operation. Therefore, various ways to detect, track, and interdict
potentially unauthorized drones carries critical importance for
surveillance and ATM applications. In this paper, we will review
techniques that rely on ambient radio frequency signals (emitted
from UASs), radars, acoustic sensors, and computer vision
techniques for detection of malicious UASs. We will present
some early experimental and simulation results on radar-based
range estimation of UASs, and receding horizon tracking of
UASs. Subsequently, we will overview common techniques that
are considered for interdiction of UASs.
Index Terms—Drones detection, interdiction, Internet of Things
(IoT), mmWave radar, surveillance, tracking, UAS, UAV.
I. INTRODUCTION
Enabled by the advances and miniaturization in
computing, communication, and sensing, unmanned
aircraft systems (UASs) such as quadcopters, fixed wing
aircrafts, and baloons have found several applications in
the past decade. Some of the popular UAS applications
include border surveillance [1], agriculture [2], disaster
monitoring [3], [4], traffic monitoring [5], remote sensing [6],
construction management [7], transportation [8], [9], and
telecommunications [10], [11]. Due to their extensive use
cases, potential for disruption, and decreasing costs of
ownership/operation, UASs have a rapidly growing user
community [8], [12]–[22].
In parallel to these advancements, there has been a continued
growth in air traffic density and complexity in the United States
and across the world. Proliferation of commercial UASs will
bring the challenge of integrating the UASs to the national
airspace. Even though UASs will initially fly in airspace
separate from the piloted aircraft, “mixed airspaces” will be
observed in the future. In fact, NASA Aeronautics Research
Mission Directorate’s (ARMD’s) Strategic Implementation
Plan (SIP) for years 2025-2035 and beyond 2035 time frames
envision a (i) fully integrated terminal, enroute, surface and
and arrivals/departures operations (ATM+2), and (ii) fully
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Fig. 1: Detection of unauthorized small UASs around restricted areas.
autonomous trajectory services (ATM+3) for the national
airspace [23]. Therefore, in the long term, full integration of
UAS throughout the worldwide airspace (and beyond, e.g.,
stratospheric flights) are expected, which requires effective and
safe air traffic management (ATM) techniques for the mixed
manned/unmanned flights. This requires development and
integration of highly-reliable and efficient communications,
navigation, and surveillance technologies among aircraft,
ground stations, and other entities.
Safety and efficiency of future ATM relies on adapting
to major emerging challenges that small UASs pose. Small
UAS have developed to the point that they can carry several
pound payloads automatically to any destination within ranges
up to 10 miles, at the push of a button, out of the
box [24]. They are cheap, disposable and hard to detect
and track. Future ATM must safely coexist with a high
density of independent small UAS while being able to prevent
intruders from endangering the security of protected zones.
Therefore, reliable and consistent detection of unauthorized
UASs enables timely deployment of countermeasures, reducing
or eliminating the potential risks associated with a possible
intrusion. Indeed, this challenge has received extensive
attention from both academia and industry. For example,
some of the recent start-up companies that aim to develop
technologies for detecting/tracking commercial UASs include
Drone Detect [25], Dedrone [26], Drone Watcher [27], Sky
Droner [28], and Sky Safe [29].
In this paper, our main goal is to provide a unified
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20170009465 2019-08-31T01:59:01+00:00Z
2review of the available techniques for detecting, tracking, and
interdicting small unauthorized UASs around restricted areas,
as illustrated in Fig. 1. We consider that UAS detectors are
deployed around the area of interest; the detectors can be
ground or aerial units (see e.g., the Aerial Dragnet concept
from DARPA [30]). If the trajectory of the UAS remains
outside the protected area, it is considered to be safe. If
the trajectory crosses in the protected area the drone needs
to be detected and brought down outside of the protected
zone. The UAS detectors can use a variety of techniques:
radar (mmWave, UWB, other), radio frequency (RF) signals
radiated from UASs, acoustic signals, and computer vision
methods. After a review of these techniques and some related
experimental results, we will present an approach for tracking
of malicious UASs by other UASs.
This paper is part of four review papers that will be
presented during the IEEE DASC 2017 special session
titled Hyper-Spectral Communications and Networking for
ATM (HSCNA). The special session will review the major
goals of the recently awarded NASA University Leadership
Initiative (ULI) project described in [31]. The project
aims to address six major technical challenges related to
communications, navigation, and surveillance (CNS) for civil
aviation applications. This survey paper will address the
technical challenge five in [31] related to unauthorized
UAS/jammer detection/localization techniques, and the other
five technical challenges are described/reviewed in the other
three papers to be presented in the same IEEE DASC special
session [32]–[34].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
In Section II, review of radar based techniques for
detection/tracking/classification of drones is presented.
In particular, mmWave radars, UWB radars, and other
radar techniques are studied. In Section III, drone detection
techniques other than radar systems are surveyed; namely, RF
based techniques, acoustic sensors, camera vision, and sensor
fusion. Section IV provides a review of drone tracking and
jammer localization techniques and provides some preliminary
results. Finally, Section V provides some concluding remarks.
II. RADAR BASED TECHNIQUES
When there is no active RF radiation from a drone (e.g., fully
or mostly autonomous operation), or if such RF signals can
not be detected reliably, use of RF radar techniques can be an
appealing approach for detecting/tracking drones. As opposed
to e.g., optical sensors, radars are active sensors, and they can
operate at day or night. In this section, we will consider radar
based techniques for detection/tracking/classification of drones
and provide a survey of the related work in the literature.
In particular, we will study three major categories: mmWave
radars see e.g. Fig. 3(a), UWB radars (see e.g. Fig. 3(b)), and
other radar based techniques.
The two use case scenarios for radar based drone
surveillance are summarized in Fig. 2 (see e.g. [35]). In
one use case, Fig. 2(a) shows that one (or more) radars
can be used to monitor a restricted area and detect/track
drones entering/within that area. In another use case shown
in Fig. 2(b), the multiple radars with directional transmissions
(e.g., for the purpose of covering a larger area) may also be
Restricted Area
Drone Radar
Restricted Area
Drone Radar
Drone Radar
Target Drone
Target Drone
(a) Monitoring of Restricted Area (b) Geofencing of Restricted Area
Fig. 2: Radars for (a) restricted area monitoring, and (b) geofencing.
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Fig. 3: (a) mmWave software defined radios (SDRs) from National
Instruments [36], and (b) P440 UWB transceiver from Time Domain,
Inc. [37].
used as a geofence, to detect drones entering a restricted area,
which may trigger further action for the interdiction of drones.
A. mmWave Radar
The mmWave radars have very large bandwidths, and hence
can provide a high resolution that can facilitate accurate
detection, classification, and tracking of unauthorized UASs.
A major challenge with radar based detection of micro-drones
is that they have very small radar cross section (RCS), and
they fly at lower altitudes and at lower speeds compared to
larger drones [38].
Use of mmWave radars enables one to analyze precisely
the Doppler spectrum, which can provide information for
classifying the type of the drone. In particular, the relative
motion of the rotating blades of the UASs with respect
to bulk motion of the UAS generates time-varying Doppler
characteristics (referred as micro-Doppler, see [39] for a
nice survey), which may enable highly accurate UAS
classification [40], [41]. Even though it is usually difficult to
distinguish small UASs from birds using conventional features
of the target, revealing the micro-Doppler characteristics
enable successful identification even for small-size drones [42].
Especially when the target is moving tangentially with respect
to the radar, where the relative distance does not change
significantly, the Doppler characteristics are the only source
in target classification and even tracking [43]. In addition, the
detection and classification of the flying UASs have significant
importance for other UASs trying to avoid from possible
collisions [44].
In [35], frequency-modulated continuous-wave (FMCW)
radar operating at 35 GHz was used to classify DJI Phantom
2 (quadcopter) and DJI S1000 (octocopter) drones, at radar
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Fig. 4: SDR-based multi-antenna mmWave drone radar.
ranges between 30 − 90 m. Authors observed wide Doppler
sidelobes in range-Doppler profiles due to the high carrier
frequency. On the other hand, information about the drone’s
range, radial velocity, size, type, and even shape can be
extracted (and altitude if two antennas are used).
Authors in [45] present a mmWave radar operating at
94 GHz at 20 dBm transmit power, a bandwidth of 1 GHz,
and a range resolution of 15 cm. The radar can cover distances
from 10 m up to several hundred meters. In [46], the authors
considered the use of a 16 receive, 16 transmit MIMO radar
to generate 256 virtual elements during signal processing to
detect and track drones. The radar operates at 36 GHz central
frequency, and uses pulses of duration 500 ns. A hypothesis
testing framework is developed to decide whether a drone
exists within a certain range/angular cell. Experimental results
by the authors show that the target drone can be tracked
accurately at distances exceeding 100 m, and at radial velocity
of about 5 m/s.
As a type of multistatic radar, MIMO radar can be
considered as a fruitful concept at the intersection of the
communication and radar systems. With the use of widely
separated antennas, MIMO radar can achieve a high spatial
diversity enabling the detection and parameter estimation of
the targets more accurately [47]. In this regard, MIMO radar
is discussed to achieve a larger diversity gain as compared
to the conventional phased array radar, which inherently
improves detection and tracking quality [48]. In MIMO radars,
non-orthogonal waveforms can be employed for transmission,
where a properly chosen set of such waveforms can achieve
the same diversity gain as orthogonal waveforms [49]. From
a different perspective, MIMO radar can achieve almost
constant SNR by statistically averaging over many decorrelated
subchannel outputs, where small RCS fluctuations modeled as
Swerling I are improved to be of Swerling II case without
any loss of time [50]. In [51], a MIMO radar approach is
considered, which has been relatively recently developed to
thin a radar array. The paper designs mmWave planar arrays for
MIMO radar, under the limitation of spreading sequence length
due to increased Doppler effects at mmWave frequencies. Both
24 GHz and 94 GHz are considered, and unit cell layouts for
the transmitter/receiver array configurations are provided.
Building on these recent related work, we plan to develop
an SDR-based mmWave radar testbed to detect/track/classify
commercial small UASs. An advantage of such a platform is
that it can also be used for other purposes such as mmWave
communications and channel sounding. We will develop the
testbed using the PXI platform from National Instruments [36]
as shown in Fig. 3(a). Multiple mmWave transceiver/receiver
pairs will be integrated into the SDR platform to evaluate
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Fig. 5: mmWave radar kits from (a) Ancortek [52] and (b) Fraunhofer
Institute [53] for drone detection applications.
diversity gain, as shown in Fig. 4.
The SDRs produced by Ancortec Inc. [52] are smart
alternatives for building mmWave radar to detect and
track small-size drones. In particular, 2400AD2 SDR kit
shown in Fig. 5(a) that operates at the 24-26 GHz
band outshines the others with its dual receiver channels
enabling interferometry-based micro-Doppler measurements.
The prototype by Fraunhofer shown in Fig. 5(b) consists of
a mechanically-scanning surveillance radar and a monopulse
tracking radar, both of which operate at the 94 GHz centre
frequency with 100 mW transmit power [53]. The system is
also supported by a high resolution optical camera to provide
LOS vision. The tracking radar emits a CW signal of 1 GHz
bandwidth, and hence, achieves a range resolution as small as
15 cm, which is suitable for small-size drone tracking.
B. UWB Radar
Due to their very high temporal resolution, UWB technology
has been extensively considered in radar applications in
the literature, for tracking people (also beyond walls [54]),
vehicles [55], [56], heartbeat [57], and vital signs [58]. Flexible
FCC regulations for UWB transmissions make the use of UWB
radars a viable alternative for detecting/tracking drones.
There are different emission masks defined by the
FCC applicable to different types of UWB transmissions:
communications devices (separate masks for indoor and
outdoor), imaging devices, and vehicular radar systems. The
maximum transmit power allowed for UWB devices based
on FCC’s Part 15 rules is -41.3 dBm/MHz; however, this
maximum transmit power is allowed only within certain range
of frequencies, and maximum transmit power limit is lower at
other spectrum. In particular, -41.3 dBm is allowed between
3.1 GHz to 10.6 GHz for communication applications, 1.99
GHz to 10.6 GHz for through wall imaging applications
(limited to law enforcement and rescue teams), and 22 GHz
to 29 GHz for vehicular radar systems [59, Ch. 1]. For
vehicular radar applications, the UWB radar can be mounted
on terrestrial transportation vehicles, and can be actively used
while the devices are mobile or stationary [59, Ch. 1].
Use of UWB technology for detection of drones has been
considered in the existing literature. In one of the earlier
works [60], use of C-band UWB radar (500 MHz bandwidth
centered at 6.35 GHz) at micro air vehicles is considered,
with applications including detection of nearby obstacles with
small RCS for collusion avoidance. In [61], considering the
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Fig. 6: Distributed ground/airborne UWB radar for drone detection.
24-26 GHz band, characteristics of UWB radar echoes from a
drone are studied, which shows that echoes from the drone’s
rotor blades can be observed for UAS classification purposes.
Inverse synthetic aperture radar (ISAR) based imaging of
rotating blades in a drone using a Time Domain P410 UWB
radar is studied in [62].
In [63] detection of drones using Ku-band (11.7-12.7 GHz
for downlink, 14-14.5 GHz for uplink) battlefield radar is
evaluated. In particular, the radar range for a given target
detected by the UWB radar is defined as [63], [64]
Rmax =
(
PTG
2λ2
(4pi)3FkT0BL
σ
ρ
) 1
4
, (1)
where PT is the radar transmit power, G is the transmit
antenna gain, λ denotes the wavelength of the radar signal,
σ is the RCS of the target object, F denotes the noise
figure of radar receiver, k and T0 are the Boltzman constant
and the temperature, respectively, B is the radar receiver’s
bandwidth, L captures the losses from the transmission, and
finally ρ is the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the radar receiver.
Moreover, [63] also shows that the SNR can be expressed
as a function of radar’s target detection probability (PD) and
false alarm probability (PFa) as ρ =
ln(PFA)
ln(PD)
− 1. Using this
relationship with (1), for a fixed PFa, one can express the
detection probability of the target as a function of detection
range and different RCS values of the target. The paper then
compares the detection probabilities of three commercial small
UASs for different values of PFa: X8, High On, and Iris+,
resulting in a conclusion that detection probability of Iris+ is
significantly lower due to its smaller RCS.
In [65], a detect-and-avoid (DAA) UWB radar on-board
implementation is presented, which also implements MIMO
radar to improve UAS target detection probability. Simulation
results with five target drones show that they can be
accurately localized in the elevation/azimuth angular domain
using the proposed UWB MIMO radar technique. In [66],
detection/localization of high-speed moving targets is studied
using a short-range UWB radar with an antenna array. In
addition to studies that consider using UWB radar for detecting
drones, there are also recent literature which consider the use
of UWB technology for localization of drones. For example,
Fig. 7: Range estimation to a UAS using UWB radar [31].
in [67], Time Domain PulseON 400 UWB transceivers at a
drone and a ground station are used to estimate the range
from the drone. The considered approach uses the two-way
time-of-flight technique and can work at communication
ranges up to 80 m for 3D localization of the drone.
In our work, we consider a scenario as in Fig. 6
which consider a distributed UWB radar scenario, with both
ground-based and airborne Time Domain P440 UWB radars.
We will first consider line-of-sight (LOS) scenarios, and
jointly process the data collected at multiple UWB radars for
detection/tracking/classification of a target drone.
For proof of concept purposes, we conducted preliminary
experiments with the Time Domain UWB radar equipment to
evaluate range estimation accuracy to a small quadcopter. A
large number of channel impulse response (CIR) realizations
based on the reflected radar signals from the UAS were
captured at the UWB radar receiver, and consecutive channel
impulse responses are subtracted from each other to filter
out the multipath components from static objects (clutter).
From these data, statistics (e.g., variance and mean) of the
Doppler effect can be calculated, which can then be used to
find likelihood functions and subsequently the range estimates
at each time instant using a maximum likelihood estimator.
Finally, a Kalman filter was used to track the range of the target
UAS as shown by the red curve in Fig. 7, where the white
dots illustrate the instantaneous range estimates to the target
drone. Results show that with time domain Kalman filtering
the noisy range likelihood estimates can be smoothed to obtain
an accurate range estimate to the target UAS. Range estimates
at multiple radar locations can be used to detect the UAS’s
location. Directional antennas and beamforming techniques
can be further used to increase the radar detection range.
C. Other Radar Techniques
In addition to mmWave and UWB based radar techniques,
narrowband radars at lower central frequencies may also be
utilized for detection of UASs. For example, in [38], authors
consider the use of multi-static radars operating at 2.4 GHz
5to analyze micro-Doppler signatures of micro-drones (DJI
Phantom Vision 2) with different payloads, and classify drones
into no payload, 200 g payload, and 500 g payload categories.
A transmit power of 23 dBm was used, along with horizontally
polarized antennas with 24 dBi gain and 10◦×10◦ beamwidth,
at radar to target distances less than 100 m. The proposed
feature detection techniques consistently achieve more than
90% classification accuracy for different payload types.
In a similar context to [38], in [68] authors consider
classification of drones with different payloads using a
2.4 GHz radar. Features of the drone related to the RCS
and micro-Doppler signatures are used, and classification
techniques such as discriminant analysis, naive Bayes, and
random forest theory are utilized. In [69], both time domain
and micro-Doppler discrimination of the signatures are utilized
to detect drones with a 2.4 GHz radar (using a constant false
alarm rate detector), by enhancing the difference between the
ground clutter and reflections from the drone. Moreover, an
extended Kalman filter is introduced for tracking the drone
in two dimensions. The RCS simulations and measurement of
a DJI drone at a frequency of 2.4 GHz and a bandwidth of
45 MHz is carried out in [70], which sheds light for the effect
of different drone/blade materials on the signatures observed
at a radar system.
D. NLOS Radar Based Drone Detection and Tracking
The detection and tracking of small drones flying at
moderate altitudes can be even more problematic in urban
areas, as illustrated in Fig. 8. The total obstruction or
shadowing imposed by the densely located buildings generally
makes even the detection problem very difficult. In urban areas,
since it is hard to provide a clean view for LOS transmission
towards the target to be detected and tracked, we need to rely
on multipaths arising from scattering of the transmitted signal
from various obstacles in the environment [71], [72]. This
non-LOS (NLOS) based approach, which can also be referred
to as “seeing beyond the corner” [73] or “around-the-corner
radar” [74], can take the full advantage of multipaths to
increase the coverage for detection and tracking functionalities
in dense urban areas [75].
Even though the multiple paths have been considered
traditionally as nuisance to be eliminated, it becomes a source
of spatial diversity by this NLOS based positioning and
ranging approaches [71]. In order to coherently combine the
multiple signals coming from various paths and extract the
range information, some prior information on the topology
of the environment, such as exact locations of roads and
buildings, should be utilized [76]. In this regard, the channel
impulse response or equivalently the scattering map of
the environment should be characterized a priori [77]. It
can be argued that the detection of a breathing human
by micro-Doppler techniques can be extended to NLOS
environments when a perfect knowledge of the surrounding
geometry is known and multipath signals are employed in
ranging [73], [78]. Note that, multiple antennas can also be
employed to improve the accuracy and the resolution of this
NLOS based ranging approach [79], similar to employing
multiple transceivers in synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imaging
relying on multipaths [80]. Finally, as many transmission
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Fig. 8: Detection/tracking of a drone using NLOS radar.
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Fig. 9: Ray tracing software: Winprop from Altair [82] and Wireless
Insite from Remcom [83].
frequencies for such short-range drone detection applications
are also available for communication purposes, joint design
of both hardware resources and algorithms for radar and
communication systems is of significant importance [81].
E. Ray Tracing Simulations
Due to challenges involved in measurements for radar
based detection of UASs, ray tracing software offers a
convenient alternative for simulating different scenarios.
Various commercial software tools are available for ray tracing
such as WinProp [82] and Wireless InSite [83] as shown
in Fig. 9. These software can be used to quickly model
urban, suburban, rural, and indoor environments using built
in graphical editors. As of the date of this writing, based
6Fig. 10: Simulated urban scenario using Wireless InSite software.
Transmitter is located on the ground, and UAS with the on-board
receiver follows the illustrated trajectory [84].
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Fig. 11: Cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the RMS-DS using
ray tracing simulations for different UAS heights at 28 GHz mmWave
band. Four different environments are considered: (a) Over sea, (b)
Rural, (c) Suburban, (d) Urban [84].
on the information in their websites, WinProp supports ray
tracing in RF spectrum up to 75 GHz, while Wireless Insite
supported frequencies up to 100 GHz. They also consider
realistic propagation phenomena such as the atmospheric
oxygen absorption at 60 GHz and diffuse scattering from
objects at mmWave bands.
It is possible to model reflections from a moving UAS with
ray tracing simulations. However, to the best knowledge of the
authors, micro-Doppler effects (e.g., due to signals reflected
from the propellers of the drone) can not be characterized
using the available ray tracing software in the market. Recent
work in the literature show that ray tracing simulations result
in more optimistic propagation characteristics when compared
to real world measurements in similar environments. For
example, results in [85] show that the root mean square
(RMS) delay spread (DS) simulations with WinProp in an
urban environment are lower when compared to real world
measurements in a similar environment, primarily due to
diffuse scattering effects in the real world.
Fig. 10 shows the simulation of an urban environment
using Wireless InSite [84]. The transmitter is located on the
ground, and the UAS with the on-board receiver follows the
illustrated path. Considering a similar framework, both radar
and communication ray tracing simulations can be conducted
for various UAS scenarios and frequencies up to 100 GHz.
The RMS-DS results obtained using ray tracing simulations for
the 28 GHz mmWave band are shown in Fig. 11. The results
show that the RMS-DS is the largest for urban environment
with high density of scatterers for most of the UAS heights.
The RMS-DS increases as a function of the UAS height in the
urban environment for the trajectory shown in Fig. 10. The
main reason for this behavior is that, at higher UAS altitudes,
the UAS moves above the tall buildings, and it can observe
signals that are scattered from larger number of surrounding
buildings. On the other hand, results in Fig. 11(a), Fig. 11(b),
and Fig. 11(c) for over sea, rural, and suburban environments
show that, as opposed to the urban environment, the RMS-DS
actually decreases with UAS altitude due to less scattering.
III. OTHER UAS DETECTION APPROACHES
Apart from radar based techniques, there are other
approaches for detecting/tracking drones. In this section, we
will study four different alternative approaches: utilization of
RF signals radiating from UASs, acoustic sensors, computer
vision, and sensor fusion.
A. Radio Frequency Signals from UASs
One possible approach to detect/track UASs is to use signals
that are broadcasted from the UASs. Such signals can be
control signals between the UAS and the remote operator
(typically at 2.4 GHz), while they may also be payload
signals such as video communications between the UAS and
the ground station. In [86], three possible approaches are
considered for drone detection: analysis of the reflected signal
from the propellers, sniffing the communication between the
drone and its controller, and analysis of the reflection patterns
from vibration of the drone’s body. In [87], frequency hopping
spread spectrum signals from a UAS are extracted using
SDRs to detect (and jam/spoof) the UAS. This approach can
be generalized to train a classifier (e.g., a neural network)
for identifying unique RF transmission patterns from popular
commercially available UASs. Different RF techniques for
remote UAS control are characterized in [88]. In particular,
analog FM’s RF signature is compared with that of spread
spectrum technique, where the latter is shown to have
distinguishable RF footprint compared to FM.
B. Acoustic Sensors
Yet another approach for detecting/classifying UASs is
through the use of acoustic sensors [89]–[93], which can detect
UASs at distances ranging from from 20 m [89], [93] up to
600 m [90]. For example, in [89]–[91] microphone arrays have
been used which can (through beamforming) find the direction
of the drone in 3D. Hence, using more than one microphone
arrays, location of the drone can be identified. In all these
three works, a known signature of the drone (which should be
captured a-priori) is searched within the real-time spectrogram
of the captured acoustic signals. Acoustic detection of a
drone can be completely passive and relatively inexpensive;
however, they get impacted from factors such as wind and
other background noise.
7Fig. 12: Target UAS and tracking UAS trajectories [97].
C. Computer Vision
Finally, detecting/tracking of unauthorized drones can be
achieved using computer vision techniques, which enjoyed
extensive advances within the past years [94]. For example,
in the ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Competition
(ILSVRC), the average detection precision has reached 0.80
in 2016 from 0.22 in 2013. While they suffer from line
of sight limitation (e.g., due to cloud, fog, dust), merits of
computer vision techniques for drone detection include 1)
detecting drones that do not have RF transmission; 2) passive
and cheap optical sensors; and 3) inherent directional accuracy.
An approach such as in [95] can be used to track a moving
and rotating UAS in a complex and dynamic background.
Visual/thermal cameras with different fields of views (FOVs)
can be used simultaneously for faster and more accurate
detection. In [96] a collaborative smart phone sensing based
drone detection is studied which e.g. can detect shape, color,
orientation of the drones.
D. Sensor Fusion
For accurate and quick detection/tracking of UASs, data
fusion techniques that may simultaneously use information
from multiple different types of sensors can be used. For
example, in [45] joint use of a 94 GHz mmWave radar and a
high resolution optical camera is considered.
IV. LOCALIZING/TRACKING OF UNAUTHORIZED DRONES
AND JAMMERS
Using the signal strength observations from an unauthorized
target drone, it is possible to localize and track them. The
signals captured from a drone may be due to legitimate control
and/or payload communications from a drone. On the other
hand, there may also be drones which are jamming a certain
area [97] and they need to be localized and interdicted. To this
end, fixed sensors on the ground, as well as one or more other
UASs can be used (see Fig. 1).
A specific technical challenge in jammer localization
is to locate a low power and smart jammer that can
effectively hamper link layer communication reliability by
intermittently emitting a small amount of energy relative
to emitted signals from authentic sources. The jammer
detector should be able to achieve a high probability of
detection while maintaining a low probability of false alarm
where the jammer is actively avoiding detection. A specific
technical challenge in unauthorized UAS detection is to rapidly
detect the small size and RCS associated with small UAS.
Detection and localization of unauthorized UAS becomes
even more challenging when the intrusion is supported by
simultaneous jamming. The performance metrics for this
work consist of probability of false alarm and probability of
detection for jammer and intruder detectors, and localization
accuracy for jammer and intruder trackers. We will also
study detection/tracking convergence time and computational
complexity.
In [97], we have proposed to use multiple UAS to localize
and track a mobile UAS jammer as illustrated in Fig. 12.
The swarm of UAS aims to achieve the Cramer-Rao lower
bound on achievable localization error through maximization
of the so-called D-optimality criterion [97], [98]. Authors
of [98] used a Fisher information matrix (FIM) predictive
model and a receding horizon maximization technique to plan
feasible paths for the UAS that lead to the best achievable
localization error bound. In other words, the UAS take
into account the estimated trajectory of the target while
determining their optimum paths. Here we assume that the
jammer is transmitting continuously. In practice, the jammer
may transmit intermittent signals to minimize its detectability,
or only a subset of the transmitted signals by the jammer
may be detected by the UAS, e.g., due to frequency hopping
transmissions of the target UAS. Some other representative
references related to tracking of UASs include [99]–[101].
Building on [97], the intermittent transmission power of
the target can be modeled as a Bernoulli random process,
which we will use to develop D-optimality criterion and
receding horizon tracking techniques for various scenarios,
e.g., different propagation channels/frequencies and different
jamming strategies. For effective operation, complexity and
convergence time are two key metrics.
In [102], we also introduced and experimentally tested a
machine-learning based approach for localization of mobile
phones using drones, where a random forest algorithm was
utilized for finding a mobile users location zone. Intermittently
available probe request messages were captured from cellular
phones on the ground, and based on the signal strength
observations at different UAS locations, location zones of the
phones were detected. The proposed approach was able to
identify the correct zone of the wireless transmitter with 82%
accuracy. In the proposed research, using various machine
learning techniques such as random forest, neural networks,
and support vector machines, we will use single and multiple
UAS for individually and collaboratively detecting/localizing
smart jammers on the ground using signal strength of the
jamming signal, where a major goal will be fast detection and
localization of the target jammer.
Once an unauthorized drone is identified and localized,
different approaches exist for interdicting them. Examples for
8Detection Technique References
UWB Radar [60]–[63], [65]–[67]
mmWave Radar [35], [45], [46], [52], [53]
MIMO Radar [46]–[51]
Other Radar [38], [68]–[70]
NLOS Radar [71]–[81]
Ray Tracing Simulators [82], [83]
Ambient RF Signals [86]–[88]
Acoustic Signals [89]–[93]
Computer Vision [94]–[96]
Sensor Fusion [26], [45]
Drone Tracking [97], [99]–[101]
Drone Detection Companies [25]–[29]
Drone Interdiction [103]–[108]
TABLE I: Representative list of references from the literature that are
reviewed in this paper.
such approaches include the use of a drone jammer gun [103];
bazooka that fires giant nets to a drone [104]; de-authentication
cyber attack to a drone [105]; eagle trained to catch a drone
and place in a safe zone [106]; net traps used by large drones
to catch smaller drones [107]; and taking control of a drone
using GPS spoofing [108].
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we provided an overview of drone detection,
localization, classification, and tracking techniques in the
literature. A particular emphasis has been on radar based
techniques such as mmWave, UWB, 2.4 GHz, MIMO, and
NLOS radars for drone detection. Alternative approaches
such as those using the RF signals broadcasted from the
drones, acoustic and camera vision based methods, and sensor
fusion techniques are also discussed. Our future work in the
context of a three-year NASA ULI funded project will be
implementing and testing several of these approaches using
computer simulations and real world experiments. Some of
the key references surveyed in this paper are categorized and
summarized in Table I.
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